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INTRODUCTION
At the University of California, Berkeley’s campus in the
mid-1960s, the Free Speech Movement was at the center of
campus dynamics as students protested the administration’s
ban on political activities on campus.1  A different set of free-
speech concerns has since infiltrated Berkeley’s campus and
that of higher-education institutions throughout the country.
Against a backdrop of national political turmoil, universities
have experienced volatile reactions from their student bodies
and outsiders in protest of the inflammatory speakers that
schools host on their campuses.  When “alt-right” commenta-
tor Milo Yiannopoulos was scheduled to make a speech in
February 2017 at Berkeley, peaceful protests against Yianno-
poulos soon descended into violence.2  Berkeley then canceled
his speech due to safety concerns.3
While Berkeley’s critics chastised the university for imping-
ing on the free-speech interests of the conservative student
group that sponsored the speakers,4 ideologically-opposed stu-
dent groups have their own First Amendment interests in pro-
testing these speeches.5  As a public university, Berkeley has
the obligation to enforce these First Amendment constitutional
requirements.6  But it also has the duty to maintain a non-
violent environment for its students, avoiding tort liability for
any potential student harm arising from the university’s failure
to do so.7  And Berkeley’s situation is not unique.  While Berke-
ley continues to grapple with these conflicts on its campus,
1 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 13
(2017); Bret Eynon, Community in Motion: The Free Speech Movement, Civil Rights,
and the Roots of the New Left, ORAL HIST. REV., Spring 1989, at 39, 51.
2 Madison Park & Kyung Lah, Berkeley Protests of Yiannopoulos Caused
$100,000 in Damage, CNN (Feb. 2, 2017, 8:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/
02/01/us/milo-yiannopoulos-berkeley/ [https://perma.cc/7KU5-7GP3].
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 2, 2017,
3:13 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/827112633224544256?
lang=EN [https://perma.cc/3DVN-8NKT].
5 See infra subpart II.A.
6 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822
(1995).
7 See infra subpart II.B.
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other universities, such as Auburn University, have similarly
balanced these competing interests.8
This Note discusses the tension between First Amendment
protections and tort liability in the context of higher education.
Specifically, it focuses on the interplay between controversial,
on-campus speakers and the violent protests that arise in reac-
tion to them.  While examining this interaction, this Note em-
phasizes the legal duties of academic institutions in facilitating
these on-campus speakers while also protecting their students’
constitutional rights and safety.  In examining these conflicts,
the Note considers one overarching question: When faced with
an impending speech from a controversial figure and the poten-
tial for resulting on-campus violence, how do higher-education
institutions best protect themselves from both constitutional
and tort liability?
Part I provides a background on this issue, contextualizing
the question in light of current events at institutions such as
Berkeley, the University of Washington, and the University of
Florida.  It highlights the importance of this question and the
urgency in answering it.  Next, the Note provides the legal
framework for considering the conflict between First Amend-
ment and tort jurisprudence.  Part II discusses the First
Amendment in the higher-education context by exploring the
competing First Amendment concerns of speakers and poten-
tial First Amendment limitations in this environment.  The Note
then provides a discourse on the evolving status of universities’
requisite duties in shielding their students from harm and
themselves from subsequent tort liability.
Part III predicts the collision between the First Amendment
protections and tort obligations in the context of controversial
on-campus speakers.  This Part first pinpoints potential
sources of constitutional and tort violations.  Because current
constitutional and tort law often prove ineffective in preserving
both the First Amendment and safety interests of students, this
Note proposes a revised constitutional standard for tackling
this issue, one that differs from the solution that legislatures
have erroneously adopted.  In enacting university policies, col-
leges should adopt and courts should enforce a revised version
of the Brandenburg v. Ohio standard.  By restricting the speech
of controversial speakers in this limited context, this standard
8 See Stephanie Saul, Richard Spencer Speech at Auburn U. Greeted by Pro-
tests, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/us/
judge-rules-auburn-must-allow-richard-spencer-to-speak.html [https://perma.
cc/KTY2-YN2Y].
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most effectively protects students from violence while simulta-
neously maximizing their First Amendment rights.  Part IV con-
cludes with guidance on how universities may draft internal
policies to adequately confront these issues according to the
Note’s proposed standard.
I
BACKGROUND
“Ray Kelly, you can’t hide, we charge you with homicide.”9
In October 2013, students and other demonstrators at Brown
University chanted this during a speech by Raymond Kelly, the
former New York City Police Department Commissioner and
supporter of the department’s controversial stop-and-frisk pol-
icy.10  Due to the audience’s continuous disruption, the univer-
sity administration canceled the speech after only thirty
minutes.11  Unlike later events involving controversial on-cam-
pus speakers, the authorities did not cancel the event for safety
purposes.12  However, these protests demonstrate the willing-
ness of students and community members to use college cam-
puses as forums to protest against outside speakers and the
contentious viewpoints these speakers represent.  This protest
signaled the prospect of escalating reactions, setting the stage
for increasingly intense responses.
Four years later, this political unrest erupted into physical
violence.  In January 2017, Milo Yiannopoulos, the notorious
conservative pundit and one-time face of the “alt-right,” spoke
at the University of Washington.13  Outside the lecture hall, a
crowd of Yiannopoulos’s protestors and supporters erupted
into fights.14  Bricks and paint were thrown, and one man was
shot in the abdomen.15
The following month, a protest against an appearance by
Yiannopoulos at the University of California, Berkeley again
9 Jillian Lanney & Carolynn Cong, Ray Kelly Lecture Canceled Amidst Stu-
dent, Community Protest, BROWN DAILY HERALD (Oct. 30, 2013), http://
www.browndailyherald.com/2013/10/30/ray-kelly-lecture-canceled-amidst-
student-community-protest/ [https://perma.cc/JSA7-6UTY].
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Katherine Long, Lynn Thompson & Jessica Lee, Man Shot During Protests
of Breitbart Editor Milo Yiannopoulos’ Speech at UW; Suspect Arrested, SEATTLE
TIMES (JAN. 21, 2017, 9:43 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/edu
cation/violence-punctuates-uw-talk-by-breitbart-editor-milo-yiannopoulos/
[https://perma.cc/2BC4-H8N3].
14 Id.
15 Id.
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turned hostile.  Protestors destroyed campus property as they
hurled fireworks, rocks, and Molotov cocktails.16  They
smashed windows, set fires, and plundered construction sites
on the campus.17  The destruction was not limited to property
damage.  Two students were attacked while conducting an in-
terview.18  Two others were similarly injured.19  Protestors pep-
per sprayed another woman.20  Because of the violence, the
school canceled Yiannopoulos’s appearance.21  Just two
months later, Berkeley canceled a speech by another conserva-
tive figurehead, Ann Coulter, because it feared a repeat
melee.22
In March 2017, Charles Murray, a controversial author
who once suggested low socioeconomic status is connected to
race and intelligence levels, was supposed to speak at Middle-
bury College.23  Student protestors disrupted the event, driving
Murray out of the building.24  In the midst of the riot, one
faculty member was seriously hurt.25  She walked away from
the fiasco in a neck brace.26  Later, in October 2017, the white-
nationalist leader Richard Spencer spoke at the University of
Florida.27  His speech coincided with a day-long protest.  Dur-
ing the protest, one man was punched, and another was ar-
rested.28  A third man fired a gun.29
At one event in November 2017, the speaker himself en-
gaged in violent physical conduct.  Lucian Wintrich, another
conservative commentator, planned a speech at the University
16 Park & Lah, supra note 2. R
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See Malini Ramaiyer, How Violence Undermined the Berkeley Protest, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/opinion/how-vio
lence-undermined-the-berkeley-protest.html [https://perma.cc/P8MM-7DD9].
20 Park & Lah, supra note 2. R
21 Ramaiyer, supra note 19. R
22 Thomas Fuller, Berkeley Cancels Ann Coulter Speech over Safety Fears,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/us/berkeley-
ann-coulter-speech-canceled.html [https://perma.cc/LMV6-QE9X].
23 Katharine Q. Seelye, Protesters Disrupt Speech by ‘Bell Curve’ Author at
Vermont College, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/
03/us/middlebury-college-charles-murray-bell-curve-protest.html?_r=0 [https:/
/perma.cc/U7MK-Q4JK].
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Protesters Drown Out Richard Spencer at University of Florida, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/us/richard-spencer-
florida.html [https://perma.cc/EP8S-AKXZ].
28 Id.
29 Id.
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of Connecticut called “It’s OK to be White.”30  Prior to the
speech, a woman snatched a copy of his speech from his lec-
tern.31  Wintrich then chased after the woman and grabbed her
in an attempt to take the papers back.32  He was subsequently
arrested and charged with breaching the peace, although the
charge was later dropped.33  These escalating encounters
demonstrate a heightened propensity for violent protests at
universities.  As a result of controversial speakers attempting
to exercise their free speech rights at universities, students are
subsequently harmed by violence at the hands of other stu-
dents and community members.
II
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
First Amendment jurisprudence and tort doctrine collide
when incendiary speakers come to campus.  Campus speakers
and protestors alike yield their own First Amendment rights,
made complicated by a potential “heckler’s veto.”  In the
higher-education context, two particularly important limita-
tions to First Amendment rights exist.  Simultaneously, in the
realm of tort liability, the duty of reasonable care that a univer-
sity owes to its students is evolving.  This evolution impacts a
university’s responsibility to protect its students from harm.
A. The First Amendment in the Context of Higher
Education
1. Restrictions on Offensive Speech
First Amendment rights on college campuses originate
from the Amendment’s text.  The Amendment states, “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or . . .
the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . .”34  Despite
the broad freedoms that the Amendment protects, these free-
doms may have limitations.
30 Derek Hawkins, Protester Who Grabbed Lucian Wintrich’s ‘It’s OK to Be
White’ Speech Charged with Theft, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/12/12/protester-who-
grabbed-lucian-wintrichs-its-ok-to-be-white-speech-charged-with-theft/?utm_
term=.1a80e29847a8 [https://perma.cc/9Z2Q-YGL6].
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Jessica Chasmar, College Adviser Arrested for Scuffle with Gateway Pundit
Writer Lucian Wintrich, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.washington
times.com/news/2017/dec/12/catherine-gregory-college-adviser-arrested-scuf
fle/ [https://perma.cc/XS7Q-SEYR].
34 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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The Supreme Court has established that the government
may not restrict speech based on content alone, including of-
fensive content.  For example, in Texas v. Johnson,35 Texas
convicted the defendant for publicly burning an American flag
in violation of its state law.36  At the outset of the opinion, the
Court determined that the defendant’s act was expressive con-
duct that was entitled to First Amendment protection.37  The
Court then quickly dismissed the State’s argument that be-
cause flag burning is seriously offensive and likely to disturb
the peace, the State may restrict the act.38  The Court
explained:
Our precedents do not countenance such a presumption. On
the contrary, they recognize that a principal “function of free
speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.
It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger.”39
The Court then overturned the defendant’s conviction, reason-
ing that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable.”40  Because Texas placed an
unjustified regulation on the defendant’s expression, Texas un-
constitutionally infringed on the defendant’s free speech
rights.41
The Court similarly analyzed the extent of First Amend-
ment protections for controversial speech in Snyder v.
Phelps.42  Here, members of the Westboro Baptist Church pick-
eted the funeral of an Iraq war veteran, holding signs such as
“Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Priests Rape Boys,” and
“America is Doomed.”43  The deceased soldier’s father brought
various tort claims against the church.44  Ultimately deciding
that the First Amendment protected Westboro’s speech be-
cause it dealt with a “matter of public concern,”45 the Court
emphasized that “[t]he arguably ‘inappropriate or controversial
35 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
36 See id. at 399.
37 See id. at 406.
38 See id. at 408.
39 Id. at 408–09 (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
40 Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
41 See id. at 411–12, 420.
42 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
43 Id. at 448.
44 Id. at 450.
45 See id. at 458, 461.
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character of a statement is irrelevant’” to the inquiry.46  Draw-
ing a hard line in support of free speech, the Court then con-
cluded its opinion: “Speech is powerful.  It can stir people to
action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it
did here—inflict great pain.  On the facts before us, we cannot
react to that pain by punishing the speaker.”47  Without further
refinement in First Amendment jurisprudence, these cases
suggest that universities will face difficulties in limiting the
speech of these outside speakers based on content alone.
2. Restrictions on Various Viewpoints
While the First Amendment prohibits restrictions solely
based on the offensiveness of speech, it also prohibits restric-
tions solely based on the speaker’s viewpoint.48  The key case
in the higher education setting is Rosenberger v. Rector & Visi-
tors of University of Virginia.49  In Rosenberger, the University
of Virginia denied a student-run Christian magazine reim-
bursement from the university’s student-activities fund.50  Be-
cause the magazine constituted a “religious activity,” it was not
eligible to receive university funding under a specific university
guideline.51  Reflecting the sentiments in Texas v. Johnson and
Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court first established that the
government may not engage in content discrimination to “regu-
late speech based on its substantive content or the message it
conveys.”52  The Court then recognized that viewpoint discrimi-
nation, a subset of content discrimination, is exceptionally
problematic.53
The Constitution thus forbids viewpoint discrimination.
This occurs when public universities restrict speech, and the
“specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”54  While universi-
ties may create “limited public forums” and require that their
facilities are only used for specified purposes, they still may not
engage in viewpoint discrimination when setting these bounda-
46 Id. at 453 (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987)).
47 Id. at 460–61.
48 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995).
49 Id.
50 See id. at 827.
51 See id. at 826–27.
52 Id. at 828; see also Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123,
134 (1992) (“Listeners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for
regulation.”).
53 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
54 Id.
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ries.55  Here, the University of Virginia engaged in viewpoint
discrimination because it allowed other student publications to
receive funding.56  Therefore, the college was impermissibly ex-
cluding religious viewpoints and violated the student group’s
First Amendment rights.57  In turn, this decision has implica-
tions for whether universities may constitutionally choose to
disinvite certain individuals from speaking on their campuses.
3. Handling the Heckler’s Veto
Correspondingly, protestors have their own right to assem-
ble and voice their opposition to controversial speakers.58
However, protestors risk engaging in a “heckler’s veto” when
their protests overpower these speakers and erode their First
Amendment rights.59  A “heckler’s veto” involves the “suppres-
sion of speech in order to appease disruptive, hostile, or threat-
ening members of the audience.”60  Governmental agents
become the instrumentalities of this suppression as private
individuals overbear the First Amendment rights of other pri-
vate individuals.61
The Supreme Court has acknowledged this danger.  The
Court in Feiner v. New York decided against a speaker who
claimed that his free-speech rights were violated when he en-
couraged African-American citizens to fight for equality on a
street corner, was arrested, charged for breaching the peace,
and subsequently convicted due to the “interest of the commu-
nity in maintaining peace and order on its streets.”62  Yet the
Court still asserted that “the ordinary murmurings and objec-
tions of a hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence a
speaker.”63  Justice Douglas further highlighted the potential
constitutional issues associated with a heckler’s veto in his
dissent: “When unpopular causes are sponsored from the pub-
lic platform, there will commonly be mutterings and unrest and
55 See id.
56 See id. at 831.
57 See id. at 837.
58 See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (analyzing the right
to peaceable assembly in the context of a Communist Party meeting).
59 See Howard Gillman & Erwin Chemerinsky, Does Disruption Violate Free
Speech?, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 17, 2017), http://www.chronicle.com/arti
cle/Does-Disruption-Violate-Free/241470?cid=WContentlist_hp_5 [https://per
ma.cc/PQ89-ZJMQ] (“[T]he right to speak does not include a right to use speech to
keep others from speaking.”).
60 Id.
61 Julien M. Armstrong, Note, Discarding Dariano: The Heckler’s Veto and a
New School Speech Doctrine, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 389, 390 (2016).
62 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951).
63 Id.
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heckling from the crowd. . . .  But those extravagances . . . do
not justify penalizing the speaker by depriving him of the plat-
form or by punishing him for his conduct.”64  Notwithstanding
that controversial speech may induce protestors to heckle the
speaker, this heckling should not override the rights of the
speaker, even on university campuses.
4. Limitations on Student Speech at Public Universities
Higher-education institutions have constitutional tools at
their disposal to limit the speech of students, protestors, and
outside speakers to protect their campus communities.  Of par-
ticular relevance to free speech in the educational context is
the seminal Supreme Court case, Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School District.65  In Tinker, students
planned to wear black armbands to their public junior high
and high schools to protest the Vietnam War.66  Upon learning
of the students’ plans, school authorities created a policy that
required any student who wore such an armband to remove it
or else face suspension.67  Despite this policy, the students
wore the armbands, and their schools suspended them.68  The
students’ parents then filed suit.69
Describing the students’ act of wearing armbands as re-
sembling “pure speech,”70 the Court recognized that First
Amendment rights are available to students.  Students do not
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or ex-
pression at the schoolhouse gate.”71  Further, students’ First
Amendment rights encompass every facet of school activities.72
But the Court also recognized that these constitutional rights
are not absolute.  Administrators must have the flexibility to
enforce their schools’ rules and manage the behavior of their
students.73
Setting out the limitations for free speech of students in
this arena, the Court explained, “conduct by the student, in
class or out of it, which for any reason . . . materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
64 Id. at 331 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
65 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
66 Id. at 504.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 505, 508.
71 Id. at 506.
72 See id. at 512–13.
73 See id. at 507.
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rights of others is . . . not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.”74  To infringe on the free-
speech rights of their students, the schools must therefore
demonstrate “facts which might reasonably have led school
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material in-
terference with school activities.”75  The expression of the stu-
dents here did not reach this level,76 and the administration
could not prevent the students from wearing armbands “with-
out evidence that it [was] necessary to avoid material and sub-
stantial interference with schoolwork or discipline.”77
Consequently, Tinker places potential limitations on the First
Amendment rights of both student speakers and student
protestors; universities may constrain their speech if it would
cause a “substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities.”78
The Court soon applied the Tinker standard to higher-edu-
cation institutions in Healy v. James.79  There, students at
Central Connecticut State College attempted to obtain official
recognition from the institution as a local chapter of Students
for a Democratic Society (SDS).80  The university’s president
denied SDS recognition because of the national organization’s
perceived philosophy of “disruption and violence.”81  The stu-
dents subsequently alleged that the university’s failure to rec-
ognize the organization deprived them of their First
Amendment rights of freedom of expression and association.82
Recognizing that Tinker similarly applies on university
campuses, the Court asserted that the president could not
deny SDS recognition simply because he disagreed with its
views.83  Instead, the university must demonstrate that recog-
nition of the group would “materially and substantially disrupt
the work and discipline of the school.”84  Because the record
did not definitively establish that SDS posed a sufficient risk of
disruption, the university’s denial of the recognition was an
74 Id. at 513.
75 Id. at 514 (emphasis added).
76 See id.
77 Id. at 511.
78 Id. at 514.
79 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
80 Id. at 172.
81 Id. at 174–76 n.4.
82 Id. at 177.
83 Id. at 180, 188.
84 Id. at 189 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 513 (1969)).
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unfounded suppression of the group’s First Amendment
rights.85
Since its inception, courts have continued using the Tinker
standard to analyze the power of schools to limit the First
Amendment rights of their students.  Many cases focus on pub-
lic-school administrations’ ability to quash the political speech
of its students, albeit often unsuccessfully.86  For example, in
Pickings v. Bruce, administrators sanctioned a student group
at Southern State College in part, for the group’s refusal to
rescind its invitation to on-campus speakers that the school
believed would “substantially disrupt the educational functions
of the College” because their speech would focus on race rela-
tions.87  However, the Eighth Circuit found that the university
did not sufficiently establish that the speakers would substan-
tially disrupt the campus.88  Instead, the record only showed
that the speakers “would expose the students and faculty to . . .
militant views . . . ; that these views would be apt to exacerbate
the tensions between the College and the community; and that
these views would be apt to provoke discussions between stu-
dents and encourage them to action.”89  Therefore, the univer-
sity’s sanctions against the student group impermissibly
infringed upon its First Amendment rights.90  Because of this
tendency for courts to uphold the rights of student speakers,
universities may still face difficulties constraining disruptive
speech on campus, despite the availability of this limitation.
5. Limitations on Political Speech at Public Universities
The Supreme Court explored potential limitations on politi-
cal speech in its pivotal case, Brandenburg v. Ohio.91  In Bran-
denburg, a Ku Klux Klan member was convicted under an Ohio
statute for advocating violence, as captured on a news broad-
cast of a Klan rally.92  The video showed members in their
85 See id. at 190–91.
86 See, e.g., Barber ex rel. Barber v. Dearborn Pub. Schs., 286 F. Supp. 2d
847, 849, 857 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (wearing a tee shirt that displays a photograph of
former President Bush with the caption “International Terrorist” does not cause
substantial disruption or material interference with school activities); Aryan v.
Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 94 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (protesting the Shah of Iran while
wearing masks does not pose a high risk of substantial disruption with school
activities).
87 430 F.2d 595, 596–97 (8th Cir. 1970).
88 See id. at 600.
89 Id. at 599–600.
90 See id. at 600.
91 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
92 Id. at 445.
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customary garb, carrying weapons and making distasteful re-
marks about African-Americans and Jews.93  In the film, the
appellant himself said, “[The Klan is] not a revengent [sic] or-
ganization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme
Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s
possible that there might have to be some revengeance [sic]
taken.”94
Despite the extreme offensiveness of the appellant’s behav-
ior, the Court reversed his conviction, holding that the statute
here violated his First Amendment rights.95  In the Court’s
view, the government cannot restrict an individual’s “mere ad-
vocacy” of violence; doing so would violate the First Amend-
ment guarantee of the freedom of speech.96  Instead, in the
realm of political advocacy, governmental interests in prevent-
ing violence may override an individual’s First Amendment
rights only when that individual’s words are “directed to incit-
ing or producing imminent lawless action and [are] likely to
incite or produce such action.”97  Because the Ohio statute
criminalized “mere advocacy,” it was unconstitutional.98
In the higher-education context, universities may use
Brandenburg’s “imminent lawless action” standard to limit the
free speech of its on-campus speakers and the assembly rights
of protestors.99  If the exercise of their First Amendment rights
reaches this level, their speech is no longer protected.  How-
ever, this standard remains quite deferential to First Amend-
ment rights.100
As courts repeatedly apply Brandenburg and its progeny,
the speech in question rarely reaches a level adequate to war-
rant constitutional government interference.  In some circum-
stances, the speech of the individual, while potentially
controversial and politically charged, is quite mild.  Whether
the speakers fail to meet Brandenburg’s intent requirement,101
93 Id. at 445–46.
94 Id. at 446.
95 See id. at 448–49.
96 Id. at 449.
97 Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
98 See id. at 449.
99 White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1227 (9th Cir. 2000) (“It is clear that the term
‘advocacy,’ as used in Brandenburg, encompasses not only freedom of speech, but
the other rights of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment as well.”).
100 See Jason Paul Saccuzzo, Bankrupting the First Amendment: Using Tort
Litigation to Silence Hate Groups, 37 CAL. W.L. REV. 395, 412 (2001) (“The result
after Brandenburg suggests that only in the most narrow [sic] of circumstances
may speech, even violent speech, be suppressed.” (emphasis added)).
101 See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107–09 (1973) (per curiam) (con-
cluding that an individual’s statement that “[w]e’ll take the [expletive] street later
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imminence requirement,102 or its likelihood of incitement re-
quirement,103 the courts properly recognize the speakers’ First
Amendment rights in lieu of other governmental concerns.  In
other cases, the individual’s behavior is quite extreme.104  But
even in these extreme cases where violence is a foreseeable, or
even actual, consequence of the individual’s speech, the courts
consistently uphold the speaker’s rights.105  Not unlike the
stringency of the Tinker standard, the Brandenburg standard’s
rigidness may still prove an ineffective device for universities to
utilize in minimizing controversial speech that inspires on-
campus violence.  This exposes institutions to tort liability for
the failure to protect their students from injury.
B. Tort Liability and the Duty of Universities to Protect
Students from Harm
In considering potential negligence claims that students
may bring against universities, the duty of reasonable care that
a university owes to its students impacts the university’s re-
sponsibility to protect its students from violence.  In pursuing a
[or again]” at an antiwar protest did not meet the Brandenburg standard, in part
because he did not intend for his speech to produce violence).
102 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982)
(reasoning that the “emotionally charged rhetoric” used by an NAACP leader did
not fulfill Brandenburg’s imminence requirement when the violence occurred
weeks or even months after these speeches).
103 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 20 (1971) (wearing a jacket
that says “[Expletive] the Draft” in a local courthouse is not likely to incite
violence).
104 See, e.g., Citizen Publ’g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 109, 113 (Ariz. 2005)
(deciding that a letter to the editor in a local paper was not directed to nor likely to
incite imminent lawless action when the letter said, “We can stop the murders of
American soldiers in Iraq by those who seek revenge or to regain their power.
Whenever there is an assassination or another atrocity we should proceed to the
closest mosque and execute five of the first Muslims we encounter.”).
105 See Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 235–36, 238–39, 246 (6th
Cir. 2015) (finding that an evangelical Christian group’s speech that advocated for
Christianity at an Arab event and “harbor[ed] contempt for Islam” was not di-
rected to incite imminent lawless action, even though the group used messages,
such as “Islam is a Religion of Blood and Murder,” “Turn or Burn,” and “Your
prophet is a pedophile,” and the Muslim crowd reacted by throwing debris at the
group).  In Nwanguma v. Trump, the Kentucky District Court found that President
Trump’s statement, “Get ‘em out of here,” was likely to incite violence when a
crowd of Trump supporters subsequently began physically attacking a group of
Trump protestors.  273 F. Supp. 3d 719, 724 (W.D. Ky. 2017), rev’d and re-
manded, No. 17-6290, 2018 WL 4323966, at *7 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 2018).  Al-
though the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court on appeal, this modern
example may indicate a heightened awareness within the courts that controver-
sial speech has yielded exceedingly violent responses in our current politically
adverse environment.
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negligence claim,106 a student must establish that he or she
experienced an injury, that the injury was foreseeable to the
university, that the university had a duty to protect that stu-
dent, that the university breached the duty, and that the
breach was the proximate cause of the injury.107 Thus, stu-
dents may not bring a cognizable negligence claim without first
establishing that universities owe their students a duty of rea-
sonable care.108
This duty has its origin in the in loco parentis doctrine,
under which universities were largely insulated from legal lia-
bility because courts considered the relationship between stu-
dents and their universities analogous to that between children
and their parents.109  This pre-1960s duty soon evolved to a
fully hands-off, “no duty” approach that lasted through the
1980s.110  Following  the “no duty” approach, courts began
narrowly imposing duties on universities for certain harms
under the vastly similar business-invitee or landlord-tenant
theories.111  Under the “business-invitee” theory, universities
owed a duty to students on their campus because of an expec-
tation that these entities would protect students from foresee-
able harm.112  This duty commonly arose in the context of
residential life, focusing on providing “reasonably safe prem-
ises” for students.113  Within the landlord-tenant relationship,
universities likewise have a duty to protect students from po-
106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965) (“[N]egligence is
conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of
others against unreasonable risk of harm.”).
107 Robert C. Cloud, Extracurricular Activities and Liability in Higher Educa-
tion, 198 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 7–8 (2005).
108 See Kristen Peters, Protecting the Millennial College Student, 16 S. CAL. REV.
L. & SOC. JUST. 431, 439 (2007).
109 See Neil Jamerson, Who Is the University? Birnbaum’s Black Box and Tort
Liability, 39 J.C. & U.L. 347, 349 (2013) (“Historically, courts had based the
institution-student dynamic on the concept of in loco parentis; accordingly, courts
compared an institution’s standard of care to what an actual parent owes a child
and granted similar immunity to institutional decision-making.”); Peter F. Lake,
The Rise of Duty and the Fall of In Loco Parentis and Other Protective Tort Doc-
trines in Higher Education Law, 64 MO. L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (suggesting that the in
loco parentis doctrine did not impose a legal duty on universities but instead
immunized them from legal liability); Peters, supra note 108, at 436 (describing R
the relationship between students and universities under the in loco parentis
doctrine as one in which universities had “expansive rights over their students
but virtually no responsibilities to them”).
110 See Jamerson, supra note 109, at 349–50. R
111 Lake, supra note 109, at 16; Peters, supra note 108, at 444–46. R
112 See Robert D. Bickel & Peter F. Lake, The Emergence of New Paradigms in
Student-University Relations: From “In Loco Parentis” to Bystander to Facilitator,
23 J.C. & U.L. 755, 763 (1997).
113 See Lake, supra note 109, at 12. R
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tentially harmful individuals through a “duty to provide ade-
quate security to protect students from foreseeable danger.”114
These business-invitee and landlord-tenant tort theories
continue to influence the scope of the duty of reasonable care
that universities owe to their students.115  Although opinions
are sometimes divergent, lower state court and District Court
decisions from the past thirty years indicate an erosion of the
“no duty” approach.  As a result, these cases also suggest a
shift to a university’s assumption of the duty of reasonable care
for its students, at least for generally foreseeable harms.116
Furek v. University of Delaware is a quintessential duty-of-
care case that is representative of this modern evolution.117  In
Furek, a student brought a negligence claim against the Uni-
versity of Delaware after he sustained permanent scarring from
a hazing ritual during his fraternity’s pledging process.118  The
plaintiff’s fraternity had hazed members in the five years pre-
ceding the incident that caused his injury.119  Even though the
university continuously issued statements denouncing hazing,
the hazing persisted, and the administration never directed
campus law enforcement to investigate hazing incidents.120
The crux of the opinion centered on whether the university
owed a duty of care to the student, relying on common law
theories of negligence.121  Recognizing that the relationship be-
tween a student and a university alone is insufficient to create
a university’s duty of care, the court then recognized that a
duty may arise when “[the university] knows or should know of
an unreasonably dangerous condition.”122  This duty “extends
only to the acts of third persons which are both foreseeable and
subject to university control.”123  In determining that the haz-
ing here was foreseeable to the university because of its knowl-
edge of the activity, the court explained, “where the property
owner has attempted to provide security or regulate a hazard-
114 Peters, supra note 108, at 446. R
115 Id. at 449.
116 Bickel & Lake, supra note 112, at 755 (describing an increased willingness R
of courts to impose duties on universities through tort law); see Peters, supra note
108, at 450 (identifying foreseeability as the most crucial consideration in decid- R
ing whether a university owes its students a duty of care).
117 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991).
118 Id. at 509–11.
119 See id. at 510.
120 Id. at 511.
121 Id. at 513–14; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 343, 449 (AM. LAW.
INST. 1965).
122 Furek, 594 A.2d at 520.
123 Id. at 521.
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ous activity, such affirmative action is . . . at least tacit recogni-
tion that the potential for harm exists on the premises.”124
Broadly deciding that universities owe a duty of care to
students in these instances, the court concluded, “[universities
have] a duty to regulate and supervise foreseeable dangerous
activities occurring on [their] property.  That duty extends to
the negligent or intentional activities of third persons.”125  This
case illustrates the potential duties that higher-education in-
stitutions today may have in protecting their student bodies
from foreseeable harms, including those inflicted by violent
protestors.  However, in doing so, the universities may also risk
trampling the First Amendment rights of these speakers.
III
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE: SPEECH OR SAFETY?
Universities may face repercussions, from a constitutional
perspective, if they choose to prioritize their heightened duty of
care to students, to protect them from potential violence, over
the First Amendment rights of controversial, on-campus
speakers.  Likewise, universities may encounter potential tort
liability if they decide to recognize the First Amendment rights
of speakers instead of canceling speeches due to safety con-
cerns.  State legislatures have initiated their responses to this
issue, but their reaction is ineffective in resolving the key ten-
sion between First Amendment rights and tort law.  In this
specific context, a university’s constitutional obligations
should give way to the tort duty it owes to students by aligning
institutional policies with a revised Brandenburg standard.
A. Constitutional Caveats: First Amendment Implications
By choosing to emphasize their duty of care to protect stu-
dents from the foreseeable harms of violent protests, universi-
ties run the risk of violating the free-speech rights of
124 Id. at 521–22.
125 Id. at 522; see also Schieszler v. Ferrum Coll., 236 F. Supp. 2d 602, 609
(W.D. Va. 2002) (concluding that the university owed a duty of care to a student
who it knew had a propensity for self-harm and later committed suicide because it
had knowledge of potential harm); Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331,
333, 335–36 (Mass. 1983) (stating that the university owed a duty of care to a
student who was sexually assaulted by an intruder because of its duty to “protect
resident students from foreseeable harm”); Stanton v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 773 A.2d
1045, 1050 (Me. 2001) (holding that the university owed a duty of care to a
student who was sexually assaulted on campus because this type of assault on a
university campus is foreseeable and the university had a legal duty to protect
students from such foreseeable danger).
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controversial speakers.  Universities that enact such policies
face an expedient threat of constitutional violations.  Because
many of the speakers that have recently inspired on-campus
violence hold conservative ideals, universities that cancel their
speeches become particularly vulnerable to allegations of con-
tent and viewpoint discrimination under the First
Amendment.126
As discussed in Part II, the government cannot ban speech
based on its offensive content alone.  On-campus speakers
have the right to voice their opinions, even if they are contro-
versial.  Provocative speakers like Milo Yiannopoulos and Ann
Coulter provide commentary that may “induce[ ] a condition of
unrest” or “stir[ ] people to anger,” but universities may not
automatically prohibit them from speaking just because others
find their speech “offensive.”127  If universities prohibit figures
like Richard Spencer from coming to their campuses solely
because of the offensiveness of their messages, they will violate
the speakers’ First Amendment rights.  While their speech is
certainly offensive, it still deals with “matters of public con-
cern.”128  The contested speech in Snyder v. Phelps was not
unlike that expressed by these inflammatory speakers.129  The
speakers are not engaging in “refined social or political com-
mentary,” but it is commentary nonetheless.  However, univer-
sities are not canceling speakers exclusively because of the
offensive nature of their speech, but out of greater safety
concerns.
When universities take such action to prevent violence,
they inevitably consider the viewpoint of the controversial
speakers.  The “motivating ideology” of these outside lecturers
126 See discussion supra sections II.A.2, II.A.3.
127 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408–09 (1989).
128 Snyder v. Phelps, 462 U.S. 443, 456 (2011).
129 See, e.g., Callum Borchers, Is Richard Spencer a White Nationalist or a
White Supremacist? It Depends on the News Source, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/10/19/is-richard-
spencer-a-white-nationalist-or-a-white-supremacist-it-depends-on-the-news-
source/?utm_term=.9b36f04a3c20 [https://perma.cc/W8Z3-E2LN] (citing an in-
terview with Richard Spencer during which he said that “[t]he ideal of a white
ethno-state—and it is an ideal—is something that I think we should think about
in the sense of what could come after America”); Radhika Sanghani, Ann Coulter:
The Woman Trying to Be America’s Most Hated, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 7, 2016, 4:44
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/politics/ann-coulter-the-woman-try-
ing-to-be-americas-most-hated/ [https://perma.cc/LNN8-ZM3V] (quoting Ann
Coulter’s response in an interview that she “just want[ed] Jews to be perfected, as
they say”); Milo Yiannopoulos, Science Proves It: Fat-Shaming Works, BREITBART
(July 5, 2016), http://www.breitbart.com/milo/2016/07/05/fat-shaming-is-
good-science/ [https://perma.cc/G5Y4-WBG5] (“My view, of course, is that if you
are obese, you should hate yourself.”).
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is exactly what sparks reactionary violence; without these
speakers’ controversial opinions, students and community
members would not protest their presence.  Accordingly, uni-
versities will necessarily make decisions based on the speakers’
viewpoints in fulfilling their duties to student safety.  Cur-
rently, most of these speakers tend to represent viewpoints
from the far right of the political spectrum.  Universities may
require that their facilities are used for certain subject matters
only, creating “limited public forums.”  But if universities do
not suppress all political viewpoints, and instead suppress only
those that express conservative ideals, they may impermissibly
exclude conservative viewpoints.  This would be viewpoint dis-
crimination in violation of the First Amendment.
Indeed, individuals have already brought constitutional
claims against universities, including Michigan State Univer-
sity, Berkeley, Auburn University, and Ohio State University,
after the universities prohibited certain individuals from
speaking on campus for safety reasons.  These allegations have
centered on content and viewpoint discrimination.  For exam-
ple, the organizer of Richard Spencer’s collegiate speaking tour
filed a complaint against Michigan State University for violating
the organizer’s First Amendment rights, claiming the univer-
sity’s cancellation of Spencer’s event constituted unlawful
viewpoint discrimination.130  The Young America’s Foundation
and the Berkeley College Republicans also brought a claim
against Berkeley, seeking relief after the university canceled
130 Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint at 3, 6, 8, Padgett v. Bd. of Trs. of Mich. State
Univ., No. 1:17-CV-00805 (dismissed Jan. 18, 2018).  The same plaintiff brought
a similar claim against Ohio State University for its cancellation of a speaking
engagement by Richard Spencer. See Plaintiff Cameron Padgett’s Verified Com-
plaint at 10, Padgett v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., No. 2:17-cv-00919-
ALM-KAJ (dismissed Mar. 23, 2018) (describing a trend of “de facto censorship of
right-of-center political viewpoints” on university campuses (emphasis omitted)).
Both cases were settled or dismissed before the courts fully considered their
merits. See Joint Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, at 1, Padgett v. Bd. of
Trs. of Mich. State Univ., No. 1:17-CV-00805 (dismissed Jan. 18, 2018); Stipula-
tion of Voluntary Dismissal Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), at 1, Padgett v. Bd.
of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., 2:17-cv-00919-ALM-KAJ (dismissed Mar. 23,
2018); see also Jennifer Chambers, MSU Will Allow White Nationalist to Speak on
Campus, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 18, 2018, 5:25 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/
story/news/local/michigan/2018/01/18/msu-will-allow-white-nationalist-
speak-campus/109573858/ [https://perma.cc/VUF4-3W9G]; Dan Sewell, White
Nationalist, Ohio State Ending Lawsuit, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 7, 2018, 11:35 AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2018-03-07/white-nationalist-
ohio-state-ending-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/AB7S-SC4C].
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Ann Coulter’s speech last spring.131  Here, the student groups
asserted that Berkeley “engaged in viewpoint discrimination by
selectively enforcing the policy’s unreasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions” to extinguish conservative expression.132
Some courts have agreed.  After Auburn University initially
canceled a speaking engagement by Richard Spencer, a federal
district court judge overrode the university’s action, ruling that
“[d]iscrimination on the basis of message content cannot be
tolerated under the First Amendment.”133  While the Northern
District of California granted Berkeley’s motion to dismiss for
the viewpoint discrimination and First Amendment retaliation
claims against it, other First Amendment claims that involve
the university’s speaker policies are still pending.134  Accord-
ingly, universities can expect imminent litigation if they choose
to protect their students’ safety and disinvite these speakers.
The heckler’s veto is also worth considering here.135
Protestors are merely exercising their First Amendment rights
to peacefully assemble and protest the speech they deem un-
palatable.  But when universities disinvite speakers because
they fear violence will erupt, they may effectuate a heckler’s
veto, suppressing the speakers’ own free speech rights.  Public
university administrators step in as the governmental agents
that struggle to maintain campus decorum without unconsti-
tutionally penalizing the speaker.  Protestors may not silence
even the most odious of on-campus speakers in this way.  But
the veto here involves more than mere heckling.  This is a sus-
tained threat of violence from protestors who have caused sig-
nificant damage and destruction.  The veto calls for solutions
from higher-education institutions, which are in the best posi-
tion to address this threat and, indeed, have a duty to do so.
Thus, constitutional claims of a heckler’s veto are less viable
because the violence necessitates that universities act to pre-
vent student harm and subsequent tort liability.
131 Verified Complaint for Injunctive, Declaratory, and Monetary Relief Pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at 2–3, Young America’s Found. v. Napolitano, No. 3:17-
CV-02255 (filed Apr. 24, 2017).
132 Id. at 23.
133 See Saul, supra note 8. R
134 See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, at 7–8, 11, 16–17, Young America’s Found. v. Napolitano, No. 17-CV-
02255-MMC, 2018 WL 1947766 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2018).
135 See discussion supra section II.A.3.
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B. Necessarily Negligent: Tort Liability Implications
Because of the evolving duty of care that universities owe
to their students, universities now have a duty to protect their
students from violent protests that provocative speakers pre-
cipitate, an increasingly foreseeable harm.136  Moreover, uni-
versities have taken initiative to enact security measures in
anticipation of potentially violent speeches, a “tacit recognition
that the potential for harm exists on [their] premises.”137  They
have assumed the duty to provide “reasonably safe”138 cam-
puses and “adequate security”139 to their students.  This duty
extends to averting the violent acts of protestors.  Not only is
such violence foreseeable, but these acts are subject to univer-
sity control.140  Universities can prevent the violence by cancel-
ing the speeches of the speakers that incite it.  If they fail to do
so, they risk liability and increased university costs because
students would predictably bring negligence claims against
these institutions for any resulting harm.141
Once students establish that universities owe them a duty
of care to protect against destructive protests on campus, the
other elements of negligence are readily met.142  Students can
easily demonstrate that they have experienced physical inju-
ries by medical records and documentation.  Such physical in-
jury is foreseeable to the university—students and
administrators have sustained injuries during several violent
protests recently, and these events were heavily publicized.143
By refusing to cancel provocative speeches that will likely
cause violence on campus, universities breach their duties to
protect students from physical injury.  Violent protests result,
causing harm to property and, more importantly, to students.
If universities choose to staunchly uphold the First Amend-
ment rights of controversial speakers, they open the door for a
bevy of negligence claims.  Because their duties require them to
prevent student harm, universities will need to craft policies to
address the potential violence that may arise when provocative
figures are scheduled to speak on their campuses.  Such action
136 See discussion supra subpart II.B.
137 Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 521–22 (Del. 1991); see discussion
infra Part IV.
138 See Bickel & Lake, supra note 112, at 762. R
139 See Peters, supra note 108, at 446. R
140 See discussion supra subpart II.B.
141 See Jamerson, supra note 109, at 368. R
142 See Cloud, supra note 107, at 7–8. R
143 See discussion supra Part I.
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may include disinviting these controversial speakers, which, in
turn, exposes the university to constitutional allegations.
C. The Legislature’s Inadequate Response
In response to the escalating friction between controversial
speakers and protestors, Republican lawmakers have intro-
duced legislation that compels universities to ardently protect
the free-speech rights of on-campus speakers and punish
those that protest against them.144  For example, Tennessee
House Bill 739 specifically provides that higher-education in-
stitutions must adopt a policy that “requires the campuses of
the institution be open to any speaker whom students, student
groups, or members of the faculty have invited.”145  North Car-
olina has passed a similar bill.  North Carolina House Bill 527
also recognizes that campuses should be open to speakers in-
vited by students, student groups, and faculty.146  It requires
disciplinary sanctions for those disrupting others that engage
in “expressive activity,” a veiled reference to those protesting
potentially controversial speakers.147
This defective legislative solution may create more poten-
tial liability for universities.  Some have claimed that these
statutes unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment
rights of demonstrators, who have the right to peacefully as-
semble and protest opposing views.148  By failing to adequately
protect the free speech rights of protestors, it exposes universi-
ties to sustained constitutional violations.  Further, these laws
hold universities accountable for the actions of others whose
behavior they cannot control, such as protesters from outside
the campus community.149  Moreover, the response is broadly
inadequate because it does little to address a university’s duty
to protect its students from the foreseeable harm of violent
protests.  The threat of tort liability remains.
144 See Peter Schmidt, State Lawmakers Seek to Force Public Colleges to Pro-
tect Speech Rights, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 10, 2017), http://www.chro
nicle.com/article/State-Lawmakers-Seek-to-Force/239171 [https://perma.cc/
J3K9-T883].
145 H.B. 739, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2017).
146 See H.B. 527, 2017 Gen. Assemb., 2017 Sess. (N.C. 2017).
147 Id.
148 See Lauren Camera, Campus Free Speech Laws Ignite the Country, U.S.
NEWS (July 31, 2017, 5:40 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/ar
ticles/2017-07-31/campus-free-speech-laws-ignite-the-country [https://per
ma.cc/6B7H-L8MC].
149 See Schmidt, supra note 144. R
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D. A Proposed Solution: The Revised Brandenburg
Standard
Courts and public universities should look to the Supreme
Court’s constitutional guidance in Brandenburg v. Ohio to pro-
vide a solution to the conflicting interests between the First
Amendment and tort law in this context.  When deciding
whether they should disinvite speakers that have created the
threat of on-campus violence, universities should adopt a re-
vised standard based on Brandenburg’s well-established rule:
the elimination of the “directed” intent requirement for outside
speakers “likely to incite or produce [imminent lawless] action”
on university campuses.150  This standard would be limited to
circumstances involving public education.  If outside speakers
are likely to incite or produce imminent lawless action, then the
university should not allow them to speak on campus.
The current Brandenburg standard and its “directed” in-
tent requirement is not robust enough to prevent the violence
that accompanies speeches by controversial figures at univer-
sities.  Courts have consistently upheld speech that is incredi-
bly likely to incite violence because the speech was not
necessarily directed to create this violence.151  Even if the
speech was so directed, the intent requirement is exceedingly
difficult to satisfy; it requires nearly unascertainable evidence
of the speaker’s intent.  The revised standard lessens the high
burden that the government must overcome under Branden-
burg.  While the revised standard may have implications for
protestors, it becomes a particularly useful tool for helping uni-
versities to restrict the speech of the contentious outside
speakers that fuel destructive responses.  Without these speak-
ers, the probability of violent protests diminishes significantly.
Tinker, which applies to universities, emphasizes that stu-
dents have First Amendment rights that encompass all school-
related activities.152  This may include inviting controversial
speakers to campus. Tinker also gives higher-education ad-
ministrators flexibility to enforce campus rules and allows
them to restrict student speech that may cause “substantial
disruption of or material interference with school activities.”153
But Tinker is insufficient in combatting antagonistic speakers
and corresponding violent protests on university campuses.
Although these destructive protests are certainly of the caliber
150 See discussion supra section II.A.5.
151 See id.
152 See discussion supra section II.A.4.
153 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
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to cause “substantial disruption of or material interference
with” university programming, courts rarely uphold attempts
to quash the political speech of students without a high pre-
dictability that the speech would cause disruption.154  How-
ever, Tinker’s biggest flaw here is its tendency to focus on
student-centric behavior.155  Many of these controversial
speakers are student-sponsored, but are not students them-
selves.  Neither are many protestors.  Thus, Tinker proves inef-
fective in addressing the violence that these outside speakers
may incite. Brandenburg provides the opportunity for a more
workable solution.
Concededly, the elimination of Brandenburg’s intent re-
quirement may have a disproportionate impact on “unpopular”
opinions.156  But the unpopularity of these opinions is what
incites on-campus violence from protestors.157  Universities
must have the flexibility to ensure student safety on their cam-
puses and protect their students from injury, even if that some-
times affects the First Amendment rights of outside speakers.
This remains faithful to the policy that the Supreme Court set
forth in Tinker.  Further, universities are distinct, warranting
additional protection that is not available or even constitu-
tional in other forums.158  Administrators must have the power
to maintain order on their campuses, and that sometimes re-
quires restriction of free speech.
Some scholars, like Erwin Chemerinsky and Howard Gill-
man, assert that the First Amendment rights of controversial
speakers should always trump those of others, including the
rights of protestors.159  The rationale for their  argument hinges
on the acknowledgement that the modern expansion of free-
speech rights has advanced equality.160  This recognition is an
important one—free speech has played a vital role in social
progress.161  However, this argument fails to give appropriate
154 See discussion supra section II.A.4.
155 See id.
156 See Laura W. Brill, Note, The First Amendment and the Power of Sugges-
tion: Protecting “Negligent” Speakers in Cases of Imitative Harm, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
984, 1044 (1994).
157 Cf. Robert C. Post, There Is No 1st Amendment Right to Speak on a College
Campus, VOX (Dec. 31, 2017, 11:33 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/
2017/10/25/16526442/first-amendment-college-campuses-milo-spencer-pro
tests [https://perma.cc/8A7R-YYRT] (“[S]peakers are almost always invited to
campus because of their viewpoint, because someone thinks they have something
worthwhile to say.” (emphasis omitted)).
158 See id.
159 See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 1, at 23–26. R
160 See id.
161 See id.
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deference to the rights of protestors, who may also have an
important part in social progress.  Further, this contention
does not give universities a viable solution to implement when
addressing potential on-campus violence, especially in light of
the rising tort obligations they owe to their students.
Robert Post instead argues that universities should only
invite speakers that advance the universities’ educational mis-
sions.162  These speakers’ messages must enhance “the re-
search or educational functions of the university.”163  While
Post aptly identifies that university administrators need the
freedom to manage their campuses, this standard is too broad
in that most speakers could arguably meet it.  Therefore, this
requirement does not adequately protect students from the vio-
lent protests that these speakers incite and makes universities
vulnerable to tort liability.
In contrast, limiting the use of the revised Brandenburg
standard to outside speakers on university campuses still
largely protects students’ First Amendment rights.  In turn, it
provides universities with the discretion to prevent the “fore-
seeable harm” of violent protests, a heightened duty they owe
to their students.  Thus, focusing on Brandenburg poses a
greater likelihood of protecting students from harm when con-
troversial speakers come to campus while also minimizing any
infringement on the students’ free speech rights.
IV
IMPLICATIONS FOR UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES
As controversial speakers continue to pose a challenge to
universities seeking to satisfy both their constitutional obliga-
tions and tort duties, university administrators will need to
implement policies to guide administrative responses to these
situations.  In crafting its own solution to controversial speak-
ers and resulting protests, one public university has devised a
speaker-friendly policy.  However, this policy is ultimately inef-
fective.  Instead, the revised Brandenburg standard should gov-
ern the policies that universities create to protect themselves
from liability.
A. A University’s Underwhelming Undertaking
On October 6, 2017, the University of Wisconsin approved
a new free-speech policy amid escalating tensions between in-
162 Post, supra note 157. R
163 Id.
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flammatory guest speakers and their protesters.164  This policy
attempts to address the First Amendment concerns that have
emerged from this tension.165  With a primary focus on the
actions of protestors, the policy imposes punishments on stu-
dent protestors who interfere with on-campus speeches.166  If
students disrupt on-campus speeches twice, they will face sus-
pension, and if students violate the policy a third time, they will
face expulsion from the university altogether.167
In implementing this policy, the University of Wisconsin
has thus decided to prioritize the First Amendment rights of
speakers, taking extra precautions to prevent a heckler’s
veto.168  This policy therefore reflects the legislative responses
from states, such as Tennessee and South Carolina, that pro-
tect speakers and punish protestors.169  Accordingly, this pol-
icy is similarly flawed.  Most apparent, this policy does not
sufficiently protect the First Amendment rights of student
protestors.170  By prioritizing the rights of speakers and failing
to place similar restrictions on them, the university makes an
unconstitutional choice to subordinate the free-speech rights
of all students.  Simultaneously, it fails to recognize the fore-
seeable harm that controversial speakers may incite, placing
the focus solely on the protestors.
164 Todd Richmond, University of Wisconsin Approves Free Speech Policy that
Punishes Student Protesters, CHI.  TRIB. (Oct. 6, 2017, 8:19 PM), http://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/midwest/ct-university-of-wiscon
sin-protest-punishment-20171006-story.html [https://perma.cc/53UW-QF5U].
165 See id.
166 See id.; see also Regent Policy Document 4-21: Commitment to Academic
Freedom and Freedom of Expression, U. WIS. SYS., https://www.wisconsin.edu/
regents/policies/commitment-to-academic-freedom-and-freedom-of-expression/
[https://perma.cc/JPY6-782K] (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (“Protests and demon-
strations that materially and substantially disrupt the rights of others to engage
in or listen to expressive activity shall not be permitted and shall be subject to
sanction.”).
167 Regent Policy Document 4-21, supra note 166. R
168 See discussion supra section II.A.3.
169 See discussion supra subpart III.C.
170 See Beatrice Dupuy, Wisconsin University Officials Approve Policy Punish-
ing Students for Protesting Campus Speakers, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 10, 2017, 1:46 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/university-wisconsin-aims-target-violent-protests-
against-speakers-681695 [https://perma.cc/J7Q7-Q945] (acknowledging criti-
cism that protestors also have First Amendment rights).  For a critique on the
policy’s other potential weaknesses, see Kashana Cauley, When Conservatives
Suppress Campus Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/10/17/opinion/conservatives-campus-speech-wisconsin.html [https://
perma.cc/TK7M-MXKY].
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B. Policy Recommendations under the Revised
Brandenburg Standard
Disregarding the University of Wisconsin’s approach, pub-
lic universities should instead refer to the revised Brandenburg
standard in drafting administrative policies when potentially
controversial figures are invited to speak on their campuses.
Recognizing the special duty that universities have to protect
against the foreseeable harm of on-campus violence, this stan-
dard protects universities against tort liability while still pro-
moting the First Amendment rights of students.  Under the
revised Brandenburg standard, higher-education administra-
tors may disinvite speakers who are likely to incite or produce
imminent lawless action on their campuses, regardless of the
speaker’s intent.171  Universities should maximize First Am-
endment rights as much as practicable, including those of con-
troversial speakers that engage in offensive speech, until the
revised Brandenburg standard is met.  At that point, the uni-
versity’s constitutional responsibilities should give way to its
need to avoid tort liability.
To comply with this standard, administrators may imple-
ment the following policy recommendations:
• Utilize the revised Brandenburg standard only in cases
where controversial outside speakers are invited to speak
on campus or are using on-campus facilities for their own
speaking events.
• Use the Tinker standard to govern the First Amendment
rights of student speakers and protestors.  In using
Tinker’s “substantial disruption of or material interference
with” standard,172 the university must provide factual
support and specific evidence that the student speech will
meet this standard.173
• Apply policies equally to all types of speech and speaker
ideologies to minimize allegations of content and view-
point discrimination.
• Track and research the speakers that student groups and
other university affiliates invite to speak on campus and
the speakers that intend to use university facilities to hold
their own speaking engagements to identify potentially
controversial speakers.
• Monitor press coverage associated with the speaking en-
gagements for information regarding any potential pro-
tests that may arise in reaction to the events.  Press
171 See discussion supra subpart III.D.
172 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
173 See discussion supra section II.A.4.
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coverage may include university media outlets, local news
outlets, and social-media platforms.
• Gauge the extent of the foreseeability of student harm that
may arise from a potential protest.  As the foreseeability of
student harm from protests increases, the duty that the
university owes to its student body increases, necessitat-
ing action from the university to disinvite the speaker or
take other safety precautions.  In determining the foresee-
ability of student harm, universities may consider the fol-
lowing: (1) whether students have reacted violently to the
same speaker on other campuses; (2) whether the univer-
sity itself has experienced violent protests in reaction to
controversial speakers; (3) whether campus and local law
enforcement have recognized any indication of potential
campus violence; and (4) whether the location and time of
the speech will make student populations particularly vul-
nerable to harm (i.e., if the speech will take place at a
venue located in the middle of campus or on the edge of
campus, if the speech will take place during the school
day or at night, etc.).
• Determine if a speaker is likely to incite or produce immi-
nent lawless action under the revised Brandenburg stan-
dard.  To do so, universities may consider the following: (1)
whether speaking engagements by the same speaker have
spurred violent protests or other violent reactions; (2)
whether the speaker promotes violence or other illegal ac-
tivities in their communications; and (3) whether the
speaker has made statements similar to that of other
speakers who have inspired violent protests at other uni-
versities.  While the content of the speech may be an influ-
ential factor in determining this, the university cannot
make the determination based on the content of the
speech alone and should consider other contextual
factors.
• If student harm is foreseeable and the speaker meets the
revised Brandenburg standard, the university should cre-
ate an action plan for preventing student harm.
• An effective action plan will align with the university’s
duty to provide “reasonably safe premises” for students
under a “business-invitee” theory or the duty to furnish
the campus with “adequate security” under a “landlord-
tenant” theory.  For maximum effectiveness, the action
plan should call for the cancellation of the speaking en-
gagement.  At a minimum, the plan should call for en-
hanced security measures and law enforcement efforts to
protect students from potentially violent reactions to the
speech.
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• While the ultimate responsibility for student safety re-
mains with a university’s administration, the university
may create a committee to assist with addressing campus
safety and free-speech issues.  Committee members may
include university administrators, the university’s general
counsel, on-campus law enforcement, board of trustee
members, and student representatives.  This committee
will keep the university informed about current campus
events and safety concerns.
CONCLUSION
In simultaneously protecting their student bodies from vio-
lence and upholding students’ First Amendment rights, univer-
sities face more than the cost of litigation.  In preparing for
these speaking engagements and their related protests, the
possibility of violence and destruction imposes high security
costs on universities.  From February 2017 through September
2017, the University of California,  Berkeley spent $1.5 million
on security for on-campus protests.174  Since the beginning of
its fiscal year in July 2017, the university has spent $2 million
on protest-related expenses.175  Although the right-wing-spon-
sored “Free Speech Week” was later canceled,176 Berkeley pro-
jected that it would have spent $1 million on security
precautions for the event, and it spent $800,000 on security for
a short appearance by Milo Yiannopoulos in September
2017.177  Berkeley also spent $600,000 on security for an ap-
pearance by Ben Shapiro, another conservative speaker.178
Similarly, the University of Florida paid an estimated $600,000
in preparation for Richard Spencer’s speech on its campus.179
Unsurprisingly, the damage itself can be a significant financial
burden.  The February 2017 protests against Milo Yianno-
174 Aaron Hanlon, What Stunts Like Milo Yiannopoulos’s ‘Free Speech Week’
Cost, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/24/opin
ion/milo-yiannopoulos-free-speech-week-berkeley.html [https://perma.cc/
E43B-HVE3].
175 Madison Park, Universities Face Rising Security Costs for Controversial
Speakers, CNN (Oct. 31, 2017, 9:07 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/31/us/
cost-of-speech-universities/index.html [https://perma.cc/X4QM-D47K].
176 Jacey Fortin, Free Speech Week at Berkeley Is Canceled, but Milo Yianno-
poulos Still Plans to Talk, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/23/us/milo-berkeley-free-speech.html [https://perma.cc/8EHR-
TVYA].
177 Park, supra note 175. R
178 Hanlon, supra note 174. R
179 Protesters Drown Out Richard Spencer at University of Florida, supra note
27. R
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poulos’s appearance at Berkeley cost the university $100,000
for the related on-campus damage.180
Controversial campus speakers and their reactionary pro-
tests may pose a greater threat to students than physical in-
jury—it may also impact the fees students pay as part of their
tuition.181  Indeed, some universities, including the University
of Washington, have attempted to shift increasing security fees
onto their student groups.182  The University of Washington’s
policy cost the school $122,500 in legal fees before it ultimately
settled with the student group that sought to avoid paying the
$17,000 security charge.183  These increasing financial bur-
dens, in combination with increasing violence, demand action
from higher-education administrators to protect their students
(and themselves) from rising harm and rising expenses.
Violence will continue to infiltrate university campuses
amid an increasingly turbulent political environment.  While
campus safety and student well-being are certainly important
educational duties, colleges must also uphold the constitu-
tional rights of all students.  By shifting their focus from the
intent to the effect of the outside speakers that higher-educa-
tion institutions invite on campus, administrators will best
protect their students’ First Amendment rights and their right
to a safe campus environment.
180 Park & Lah, supra note 2. R
181 See Hanlon, supra note 174. Contra Erica Goldberg, Must Universities R
“Subsidize” Controversial Ideas?: Allocating Security Fees When Student Groups
Host Divisive Speakers, 21 CIV. RTS. L.J. 349, 403 (2011) (proposing that universi-
ties and taxpayers rather than students should bear the increased security costs
for controversial on-campus speakers).
182 Zach Winn, UW to Pay $122,500, Change Speaker Policy in Settlement with
College Republicans, CAMPUS SAFETY MAG. (June 20, 2018), https://www.camp
ussafetymagazine.com/university/u-washington-college-republicans-lawsuit/
[https://perma.cc/H8WC-5YZV].
183 Id.
